

A
LETTER

FROM A

Travelling TUTOR,

TO A

NOBLE YOUNG LORD,

With whom he Travelled.

CONTAINING,

GOOD ADVICE to the INDEPENDENT
ELECTORS of *Great-Britain*;

AND A

PRACTICABLE SCHEME, by which the People
may, at every future Election, provide for
themselves, without the Aid of Parliament,
what is Tantamount both to a Pension-Bill,
and an Exceptionless Place-Bill.

*Postquam divitiæ honori esse cæperant, et eas gloria, imperium,
potentia sequebatur; hebescere virtus, paupertas probro ha-
beri, innocentia pro malivolentia duci cæpit. Igitur ex di-
vitiis juventutem luxuria, atque avaritia cum superbia inva-
sere. Rapere, consumere, sua parvi pendere, aliena cupere;
pudorem, pudicitiam, Divina atque humana promiscua, nihil
pensi, neque moderati habere.* SALLUST.

L O N D O N :

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FROM A

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St. Dunstons Church, in the Strand.

A
L E T T E R
FROM A
Travelling TUTOR,
T O
A Noble YOUNG LORD, &c.

MY LORD,

I N some of my former Letters, I proposed a few Regulations for securing our Liberties against the secret Influence of Corruption, as well as against the open Force of Arms, either Foreign or Domestick; and I had the Pleasure to find, that your Lordship not only approved, but thought they would be infallible, if they could be established by Act of Parliament.

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I was sorry to find your Lordship of Opinion, that there was not Virtue enough in the deceased Parliament, for any one to expect getting such Regulations agreed to ; and I was the more sorry, because the late *double Desertion* of the Cause of Liberty had given me sufficient Reason to be persuaded of your being right in your Opinion. But what could not then be expected from Parliament, the People have now in their Power to exact, not by way of Instructions, which Experience has shewn to be of no Effect, but by the Method I am to propose, which the Law itself, as it now stands, will, in my Opinion, render effectual.

The next Election is one of the most important this Nation ever saw, not only on Account of the Danger we are in from Abroad, but also on Account of the Danger our Liberties are exposed to by the Influence of Corruption at Home ; and the unexpected Dissolution of a Parliament that had refused no one thing asked by our
M—,

M—, nor made any proper Enquiry into former Grants; — that during the whole Course of its Continuance, had tamely seen that War neglected, in which this Nation is particularly concerned; — that had tamely seen us engaged in a ruinous War on the Continent, in which our most natural Allies were either our open Enemies, or but cool or mercenary Friends; — that had tamely seen the Glory of the British Flag ignominiously sullied, and the chief Author of that National Disgrace rewarded; — that had, without the least Regard, beheld the Oppressions of our poor Soldiers laid open to publick View; — and that had turned a deaf Ear to the Cries, the Tears and Lamentations of cheated, ruined Widows and Orphans, &c, &c. &c. I say, the unexpected Dissolution of such a Parliament must render the next Election still more important.

The precipitate Dissolution of such a Parliament must certainly reflect immortal Honour upon his Majesty's Reign, espe-

cially if it proceeded from a *pure Exertion* of his Royal Prerogative ; but, I am afraid, this Exertion proceeded from the Advice of Ministers ; and if it did, the Nation has the highest Reason to be cautious in its next Choice of Representatives, and to chuse none but such as shall give the Testimony I am to propose, of their having no mercenary View, in their standing Candidates at the next Election.

I believe no one imagines, that M—— will ever advise their Sovereign to part with a complaisant Parliament, upon any *National Account*. Some Hopes, or some Fears, or some selfish Project reserved in *petto*, must always be the Cause of that Advice ; and therefore, if the Dissolution proceeded from the Advice of M——, every Man that regards his Country must apprehend their getting such a *septennial* Parliament chosen, as will approve of an infamous Peace, or an ill advised and worse conducted War, or something of a still more pernicious

pernicious Consequence now lurking in the Breast of some of our M—— of State.

If the Dissolution proceeded from a pure Exertion of Prerogative : If his Majesty dissolved the last Parliament so much sooner than was necessary, without the Advice, or against the Will of his present M——, his Motive must be honourable, because he never acted upon any but such, and it may be easily guessed at. The Consent of Parliament is by our Constitution so necessary for all Acts of State, that the King must often employ Men as his M——, whose Capacity or Integrity he has from Experience great Reason to question, meerly on Account of their having a great Influence in Parliament ; and when this happens to be the Case, he has no way of getting rid of this Set of M——, but by dissolving the Parliament then in being, in order, by the Assistance of his People, to dismiss the Rogues or Fools, which a former Parliament had made it necessary for him to employ.

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Therefore, if this Exertion of Prerogative was without or against the Advice of our present Set of M——, we must conclude, that his Majesty finds they are such as can neither conduct the *Operations* of War with *Vigour*, nor the *Negotiations* of Peace or Alliance with *Wisdom*; and that he is resolved to get rid of them, if possible. If it be so, Shall we refuse to assist our Sovereign? Shall we pretend to be better Judges than he of the Capacity or Integrity of his M——? May not the present melancholy Situation of our Affairs, both at Home and Abroad, convince us of the Wisdom and Uprightness of his Majesty's Judgment? What is the Consequence? Certainly to lay it down as a Rule in all the Counties, Cities, and Corporations of the Kingdom, not to chuse any Gentleman as their Representative, whose Interest appears to be supported by that of our present Set of M——.

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When I say this, I mean our principal M——; for as to their late Accessories, they are no otherwise a part of our Administration, than as a Gentleman's menial Servants are a part of his Family. They serve for their daily Wages, but have no Share in the Direction of the Family, and are turned off when the Master finds he has no further Occasion for them, or that he can be served better or cheaper by others. Therefore, when I speak of our present Set of M——, I mean those who were the Supports of an Administration that established the Power and Influence of *France* by the Treaty of *Hanover* in the Year 1725,——that put us to the Expence of maintaining 10000 *Hessians* for several Years, when it was evident they could be of no Service to this Nation;——that concluded the Treaty of *Seville* in the Year 1729, without stipulating any proper Satisfaction for the Losses of our Merchants, or any future Security for our Trade and Navigation in the Seas of *America*; ——
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that entered into a Guaranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction* in the Year 1731, without taking the least Care to unite the *Germanick* Body, by stipulating some sort of Satisfaction for such of the Princes thereof as had Claims upon the House of *Austria*;— that neglected that Guaranty in the Year 1733, and thereby established *France* in the Possession of the important Dutchy of *Lorrain*, and *Spain* in that of the rich Kingdom of *Naples* and *Sicily*;—— that attempted to put the Yoke of a *General Excise* upon the Necks of the People of this Kingdom; —— that in Spite of the reiterated Complaints of our Merchants, and Remonstrances of Parliament, continued for many Years to submit tamely to the *Spanish Depredations*; —— that concluded the celebrated *Convention* with *Spain* in the Year 1739; —— that laid the Foundation for the present unfortunate War, by at first countenancing and then rejecting a *Plan for a Partition of the Dominions of Prussia*; —— and finally, that allowed the *French* to put such an Affront
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upon us, as to take our *declared Enemies* the *Spaniards* under the Protection of their Flag. Who those are that supported a late Administration in all these Misrules, and many more than can be here so much as hinted at, are well known; and I must say, that if the People have any Virtue left, they will lay it down as a Maxim not to chuse any of them, nor any one that seems to stand upon their Interest.

This must be the general Rule at the next Election, if we have any Regard to our Country, if we have any Regard to our Sovereign. And now, my Lord, I shall shew, that this ought to be the Rule, even upon the Supposition, that the late Dissolution proceeded from the Advice of our M——.

I have heard many Reasons suggested for this extraordinary Advice. Some of them make me shudder to think of. I never heard of one but ought to give the Alarm to every *True Briton*. The chief of those

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I have heard suggested, I shall examine with Candour, beginning with that which I think most plausible. It is said, the *Dutch* would not enter into any Concert with us, nor declare War against *France*, because of the short Term the late Parliament had to sit ; and the Reason assigned for this is, because they could not depend upon the next Parliament's approving of those Stipulations his Majesty might enter into with them for prosecuting the War with Vigour ; whereas if a new Parliament be chosen, and a Concert entered into with the Approbation of that Parliament, they may depend upon it, that his Majesty will be enabled by Parliament, for seven Years at least, to perform on his Part, the Terms of that Concert.

In the first Place, this is an Acknowledgment that we are to expect nothing but defensive Measures for this Campaign, at least in *Flanders* ; and if these defensive Measures should prove as fruitless this Campaign, as they have done hitherto : If with
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all the Expence we have put ourselves to, we should not be able to prevent the *French* from making themselves Masters of any one Fortrefs they have a Mind to attack; before *Chriftnas* the *Dutch* may be disabled from entering into any Concert with us; They may be forced to beg a worfe Neutrality, than that which has been often offered to them before now. If this should be the Event, Ought not the Conduct of our M——, for some Years past, to be strictly and impartially inquired into? Ought we not to have a House of Commons proper for this Purpose? Can we suppose that a House of Commons, consisting chiefly of such as are dependent upon our present M——, will be proper for this Purpose?

But suppose this Event should not happen, have we not great Reason to be jealous of the Stipulations which the *Dutch* require. This very Demand: Their demanding to have them approved of by a new *septennial* Parliament, and to have

one Parliament dissolved before its Time, and a new one chosen for that Purpose, is a Demonstration, that they are to demand such Stipulations as they themselves think this Nation will not approve of. Besides, their Conduct in the War in *Queen Anne's* Time, and the Situation they are in at present, must convince us, that they will, if they can, throw the chief Burthen of the War upon our Shoulders, and at the same Time prevent our making the proper Use of it for our own Advantage. Such Stipulations our M—— may perhaps, for their own Safety, or for continuing themselves in Power, be induced to agree to ; but ought the Nation to agree to such, or ought we to chuse a Parliament that will? If it should be said, that our M—— have brought us into such Circumstances that we must either support the War upon the Continent, almost at our sole Expence, or be undone, it would be a most terrible Situation. But it is a Situation which I think impossible to be effected by the most blundering Set of M—— we ever had,

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without the Assistance of a mercenary Parliament. It may be a *Ministerial*, but it can never be a *National* Situation, as long as we are able to vindicate our Dominion upon the Ocean. If then it be the Case of our M——, that they must either support the War upon the Continent, almost at the sole Expence of this Nation, or be undone, Shall we chuse a Parliament that will support them till they have involved their Country in their Ruin? Will not this be the Consequence, if the next Parliament should be such a one as consists chiefly of their Friends and Dependants?

Thus supposing it true, that the *Dutch* require a new Parliament before they will enter into any Concert with us, or run the risque of declaring War against *France*, we ought to beware of chusing a Parliament too much devoted to our present Set of M——. But then supposing what is much more likely, that this is only a Pretence, an Expedient for the Day. We know how ready all M—— are to cook up

up a Story to serve a present Turn : We know whose School our present Set of M—— are of ; we have therefore good Reason to suspect the Truth of what is given out, and industriously propagated by their Tools and Messengers. Suppose then that the *Dutch* have found the Affairs of *Europe* brought into such a Situation by our late Treaties and Negotiations, our Alliances and Counter-Alliances, that they dare not declare War against *France*, nor any longer refuse the Neutrality offered them by that Nation ; and that our M—— are sensible, that the Prince of *Orange*, now he is Stadtholder, must do what the late *Dutch* M—— durst not, for fear of the Populace, venture to do ; that he must, to save his Country, accept of a Neutrality, unless we agree to those Preliminaries for a general Peace, which have been proposed by *France* and her Allies. Is it not in this Case highly necessary, that we should have a Parliament that will strictly inquire how the Affairs of *Europe* have been brought to such a fatal Crisis ? And can we expect

pect this from those, or the Friends of those, that have approved of all those Treaties and Negotiations by which the Affairs of *Europe* have been brought to this fatal Crisis?

I do not, my Lord, make this Supposition without some Foundation. By the late famous Project for dividing the Dominions of *Prussia*, we have raised such a Jealousy in most of the Princes of *Germany*, and perhaps in the *Northern Powers* too, as has thrown their Thoughts upon *France* for Protection. It was a Project that should either never have been thought of, or it should have been carried into Execution with the utmost Vigour and the quickest Dispatch. The Project might then have succeeded, because the *Turks* were embroiled with the *Persians*, and both the *Saxons* and the *Russians* ready to attack *Prussia*, if we had sent a Squadron into the *Baltick* to protect the latter against *Sweden*, and had employed the *Danes* and *Hessians* in the Service for which they were then
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taken into our Pay. The Princes of the Empire might then have been jealous, but they durst not have shewn their Jealousy, nor could *France* have protected them if they had, because the *Turks* could not then come against us upon the other side. The Refusal of the *Dutch* to join in that Project, was no sufficient Reason for giving it up, after it had been once mentioned : Without their Assistance, we should have been an equal Match for *France* and all the Allies she could then procure, and if the *Dutch* had secured the *Austrian Netherlands* by a Neutrality, we should have been better without them than with them, because we might then have endeavoured to get something for ourselves in *America*, without giving Offence to any of our Allies; and after having beat the *French* out of *Germany* and *Italy*, we might have attacked them in *Provence*, in *Burgundy*, and upon the *Rhine*, without being obliged either to attack them, or defend ourselves in *Flanders*.

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For this Reason, I say, this Project ought to have been carried into immediate Execution, and *Prussia* reduced by Force of Arms, or otherwise we should have resolved to gain that Prince at any rate, to an Alliance with us and the Queen of *Hungary*, as soon as we heard of the Emperor's Death. But our Conduct at that Time was of a Piece with the whole Tenor of that Administration, always Planning and Treating ourselves into some Broil, and then Re-planning and Counter-treating ourselves into another, in order to get rid of the former. By this Means we have made the *French* the Arbiters of *Europe* ; and now the *Turks* have got their Hands loose, it is impossible for us to prevent the Influence of *France*, as long as the present Jealousy reigns among the Princes of *Germany* and the *North*. Should the *Dutch*, upon our agreeing to their Terms, declare War against *France*, I doubt much if we should be an equal Match for *France* and *Spain* at Land ; but if the Fortune of War should signally in-

terpose in our Favour, and we should thereby bring *France* into Distress, is it not probable that *Prussia* at least, if not some of the other Princes of *Germany*, would fly to her Relief? And if *Russia* should attack the *Prussian* Dominions, it would only spread the Flames of War, and render our Situation still more hazardous; for the *Turks* would then declare War both against *Russia* and *Hungary*; and the *Swedes* and *Polanders* would probably take that Opportunity to reduce the formidable Power of their Neighbours the *Russians*.

Your Lordship must thus see, that I have some Foundation for supposing, that before this new Parliament meets, even the Stadtholder of the *Seven United Provinces* may find himself under a Necessity to accept of the proffer'd Neutrality; and if this be known or apprehended by our M—, they had very good Reason to precipitate the Choice of a new Parliament, because they will now find it much more easy to get their Friends chosen, than they can expect

expect to find it after this Circumstance comes to be publickly known ; but the very Suspicion of this ought to be a Reason with the People, to be extremely shy of their Recommendation.

Must not your Lordship likewise see, that if this of the *Dutch* refusing to enter into any Concert with us, till they see the Complexion of a new *septennial* Parliament, be the true Reason for dissolving the last, we have Reason to apprehend the Consequences, should our M—— be provided with a Parliament that has a *greater Regard* for *their Safety*, than for the Safety of their *Country*. As we cannot be attacked *by Land*, we may carry on a War *by Sea*, both against *France* and *Spain*, if it were for *twenty* Years, without so much as one Ally upon the Continent : By such a War we may ruin the Trade and Finances of both, and very much enrich ourselves ; for as we may in a great Measure prevent their getting any Supply of *Naval Stores*, it will be impossible for them, during the Course of the War,

if they had Seamen, to increase their Navy so as to be near an *equal Match* for us at *Sea*. But the *Dutch* may be attacked by *Land*; and therefore, before we invite them into the War, we should consider well, whether we have such a Confederacy upon the Continent as may protect them at *Land*; for otherwise we shall precipitate their Ruin, and by endeavouring to defend them, we shall render our own infallible. We are now by the Land War running *several Millions* in Debt yearly: If we engage the *Dutch*, we shall be obliged to increase our Expence at *Land*, and cannot diminish our Expence at *Sea*: We must therefore *run faster* in Debt than we do at present; and before we can put an end to the War, *our Credit may break*. If this Misfortune should happen, our Exchequer would be shut up. Instead of assisting the *Dutch at Land*, we should not be able to *defend ourselves at Sea*; and the Moment this happens to us *we are undone*.

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These Things ought to be seriously and fairly inquired into by the new Parliament at its first Meeting, but our M—— will certainly prevent it, if we do not by the Wisdom of our Choice put it out of their Power ; because, a Parliament that will do this, will next proceed to inquire, how the Affairs of *Europe* have been brought into such a Situation, that the *Dutch*, with the utmost Assistance we can give, dare not attempt to defend themselves *by Arms*, or to recover *that Barrier* which cost us, as well as them, so much Blood and Treasure to acquire. And our M—— must be sensible that such an Enquiry might probably end in their Disgrace, perhaps their Ruin.

The other Reasons for this Dissolution, which I shall mention, are such as are suggested by those who are no Friends to the Administration, and yet one or more of them may be the true Reasons. First, It is suggested, that our M—— foresee
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some Misfortunes that are likely to happen abroad before the end of this Campaign, and that from thence they judge, they may more easily manage a general Election now whilst the Minds of the People are in Suspense, than they can expect to do next Summer, when these Misfortunes shall be publickly known and severely felt. If our M—— do really foresee any such Misfortunes, it must be owned, that the late Dissolution was at least an artful, if not a prudent Step. But the very Suspicion, or even the Possibility of this, ought to be a Reason with the People, to reject, at the next Election, every Gentleman that seems to stand upon M——l Interest. For if any signal Misfortune happens to us Abroad, we ought to have a Parliament that will enquire freely, and judge impartially, who were the *remote*, as well as the *immediate* Authors of that Misfortune.

Another Reason suggested for this Dissolution is, that our present M——, I mean the Principal, being of the Negotiating, Pusillanimous,

Puſillanimous, Bully-School, which did ſo much Miſchief in *Europe* under a late Admiſtration, they are reſolved to give us next Winter *a much worſe Convention* than that their Maſter preſented us with in the beginning of the Year 1739 ; and though they had no Reaſon to doubt of their meeting with a more ample Approbation from the laſt Parliament, than their Maſter could obtain from the preceding, yet they conſidered that the Nation would thereby be inflamed, that a general Election was neceſſarily to come on the next enſuing Summer, and that from a famous Precedent in 1714, they might be impeached by a ſubſequent Parliament, for what the preceding Parliament had approved. Whereas, by bringing on a general Election this Summer, they had a Chance to get, *by Surprize*, a new Parliament choſen, of much the ſame Complexion with the former ; and if they could obtain the Approbation of the firſt Seſſion of a new *ſeptennial* Parliament, the National Flame would be over, and the
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Injury forgot, before it would be necessary to have a new Parliament chosen.

This, as the former, must be allowed to be a good Reason with Regard to *our M——*, but with Regard to *the People*, I think, I need not offer any thing to prove that it is a most solid Reason for their taking special Care, that the Parliament now to be chosen shall not be of the same Complexion with the last.

I am aware, it may be said, that if the *Dutch* conclude a Neutrality, or require greater Assistance from us than we are able, or ought to give, our *M——* must accept of any Terms of Peace that may be offered; and therefore they can have no Occasion to fear a Parliamentary Disapprobation, much less an Impeachment, nor need the People be solicitous about what sort of Representatives they chuse, upon that Account. But supposing the *Dutch* to conclude a Neutrality, or to require greater Assistance from us than we are able,

able, or ought to give; nay, supposing us deserted by all our Allies *upon the Continent*, as we shall certainly be, as soon as they find us unwilling or unable to give them the Supplies they demand, could that be any Reason for our agreeing to any dishonourable or disadvantageous Terms of Peace? No: We should then, luckily for us, be reduced to our *proper Element, the Ocean*. Let us there exert our Strength; and if it be duly and vigorously exerted *upon the Ocean and in America*, I may venture to prophesy, that in a few Years we shall be able to drive the *French* at least out of both *Indies*; because, as I have said, it will be impossible for them to increase their *Naval Strength*, during the Continuance of a War with this Nation.

But, my Lord, if we at this Time agree to a disadvantageous Peace: If we leave the *French* in Possession of any Part of their Conquests in this War, and restore them *Cape Breton*, or allow them to keep any Settlement they may have lately

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made in *Acadia*, Can we doubt the Consequence? They have in this War been made so sensible of their Weakness at Sea, that they will certainly take Advantage of the next Peace to improve, and they may improve their *Naval Strength*, so as to give us as much Reason to dread their Power *at Sea*, as their Neighbours upon the Continent have to dread their Power *at Land*. This of Course will make them find out that *Canada*, and those vast Lakes in that Country, which they have now the full and sole Possession of, may furnish them with Things more precious than *Skins* and *Furs*: I mean a *boundless Fishery*, a Multitude of *expert Seamen*, and an inexhaustible Quantity of all sorts of *Naval Stores*. Therefore, as we have them now, I may say, at our Mercy, with respect to their Possessions in the *new World*, though we should be deserted by all our Allies upon the Continent, we ought not to give them any Respite, till we have dispossessed them of every Foot of Ground, and every Privilege, in *North America* at least. If

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they lose their Possessions there, their late Conquests in *Europe* will do them more Hurt than Good; because their insisting upon keeping those Conquests will revive that Jealousy among the other Powers of *Europe*, which now seems to be asleep, or sunk into a Jealousy of another kind, which we have it in our Power to remove when we please; and when we do, then, and not till then, we shall find it easy to form such a Confederacy upon *the Continent of Europe*, as will be able, with the Assistance of our Navy, and a very little of our Assistance in Money or Troops, to reduce the Power of *France at Land*.

Thus it must appear, that the *Dutch* may be forced into a Neutrality, the *Queen of Hungary*, and the *King of Sardinia* may be forced into a separate Peace, and yet it may be unnecessary for us to submit to any Terms of Peace, but such as are consistent with our Honour, and advantageous to our Trade and Navigation; upon this Occasion, therefore, we should be cautious of chusing

for our Representative, any Gentleman that is known to have an indissoluble Connexion with that Set of M——, who, from the experienced Maxims of their School, must be presumed too ready to sacrifice both the Honour and Interest of the Nation to their own Ease, Safety, or Continuance in Power. But now suppose that, by our late Alliances and Counter-alliances, our *ostensible* and *non-ostensible* Treaties, we have raised a Jealousy against us among all the Maritime Powers of *Europe*, and that we should find the *Dutch*, the *Portuguese*, the two *North-ern Crowns*, &c. ready to join against us, rather than see us dispossess *France* of her Dominions in *North America*. This, I shall grant, it is possible, from our present Circumstances and late Conduct, to suppose, and upon this Supposition, I shall admit, it would be necessary for us to conclude a Peace at any Rate; but then, should not we have a Parliament that will freely, fairly, and strictly enquire into the Conduct of those who have been Principals or Accessories in bringing the Affairs of *Europe* into
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a Situation so fatal for this Nation? Can we expect this from the next Parliament, if a Majority of it should consist of those very Principals and Accessories, or such as have an Interest in their Impunity?

I know it may be said, that such a general Exclusion would be of dangerous Consequence to our present happy Establishment, because we could then chuse very few but *Tories*, or *Jacobites*. As to *Jacobites*, there are certainly very few of them in the Kingdom; for as to the *Tories* in general, their present Professions, and their Behaviour in King *William's* Time, must convince us, that as long as they see our publick Affairs wisely conducted, and our Liberties preserved, they will never be for altering the Succession; and if a few concealed *Jacobites* should get into Parliament, they may be of Service in removing weak, or punishing wicked M——, and in obtaining such Laws as are necessary for securing our Liberties, and redressing our Grievances; but their Numbers can never be so great as to endanger

endanger our present happy Establishment ; I must therefore confess, that in all Elections, where I have any Vote, it is my Resolution, and, I think, it ought to be the Resolution of every honest Man, I am sure, it will be the Resolution of every wise independent Elector, to give his Vote for a *Tory*, nay, even for a reputed *Jacobite*, rather than for any Gentleman who stands upon the Interest of those who seem resolved to govern, or to ruin their Country. An honest and true *Whig*, who has never, of late, had any Share in the Conduct or Approbation of our publick Affairs; nor ever deserted the Cause of Liberty, shall, of all others, be my first Choice, a *staunch Tory* my next, any one rather than an Accomplice with those, who seem to have combined to give Laws to their Sovereign, as well as their Country ; for to be governed by a Faction, is, of all others, the most pernicious Sort of Government, the most insufferable Slavery.

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The Consequence of such a general Resolution may, 'tis true, be a *Tory* Parliament; but let us consider, that the *Tories* of these Days have dropt their Principles of *Passive Obedience*, and despise *those Maxims*, which would subject us to the *Domination* of the Church. Therefore, tho' I am, always was, and, I hope, shall always be a *True Whig*, I am not afraid of a *Tory* Parliament. On the contrary, I look upon a *Tory Parliament* as the fittest for calling a *Whig Administration* to Account. It is a Misfortune for the Nation to have any *Parties* in it, but those of *Court* and *Country*; but whilst we have what is called *Whig* and *Tory*, every Man, who is not a more zealous *Party-man* than he is an *Englishman*, must think, that when we have Reason to be displeased with a *Whig Administration*, a *Tory Parliament* is the best for calling our *M——* to account; and, upon the contrary, when we have Reason to be displeased with a *Tory Administration*, a *Whig Parliament* is the only proper one for calling our
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Tory M—— to a strict Account; for by Experience we find, that tho' a Parliament be chosen upon the *Country Interest*, if it be of the *same Party* with the Administration, it only enables the *Leaders of the Opposition* to provide for themselves, by screening the *M——* they had but just before reviled and opposed.

I now come to the Third Reason for a Dissolution, which has been suggested by those who are no Friends to the Administration, and is the last with which I shall trouble your Lordship. It is said, that by the Munificence of last Session, there is now Plenty of Money in the Treasury, that our *M——* are resolved to employ great Part of it in corrupting Elections, and that by thus unexpectedly bringing on a General Election, the Party, or rather Person, from whom they expect the greatest and most effectual Opposition, cannot be provided with Money for *corrupting in Self-Defence*, which, like killing, is certainly just when it cannot be avoided.

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Tho' I have no great Opinion of the Integrity of any Minister, especially when his Safety is put in the opposite Scale, yet this is such a flagrant Piece of Wickedness, so diametrically opposite to the Maxims of our Constitution, and the established Laws of the Kingdom, that I cannot suspect even our present M—— of intending such a Crime. Whether there be any Truth in the Accusation, will soon appear, by considering what sort of Means the Candidates upon their Interest make use of for recommending themselves at the next Election, especially such of them as are known to have neither Money nor Credit of their own. If they appear with their Pockets full of Money, and build their chief Hope of Success upon the Length of their Purse, we may with Certainty guess from whence they have their Supply. In this Case, every honest Man in the Kingdom ought to take the Alarm. The Dispute will be *pro Aris et Focis*; they are already accused of endeavouring to shut up our Windows; they

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will next put out our Fires, and remove our Altars, if it should become necessary for their Safety. Surely the People of *England* do not stand in need of Arguments for convincing them, that they ought to prevent any M——'s getting a Parliament to his liking by such Means.

The People should, particularly upon this Occasion, recollect, who was their chief Friend at the Time of chusing the last Parliament, who was the chief Cause of their getting rid of the most dangerous and most hated Minister this Nation was ever plagued with. If they did not at that Time obtain all they had a Right to, expect, we all know, it was none of his Fault; for the Compromise was made without his Privity. I am sorry to say, he has not met with that grateful Return, which might have been expected from a People, whose Struggles were, by his Assistance, rendered successful; a People for whom he risk'd so much, and for whose Sake he has ever since been pursued, with the secret but implacable Rage of
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the Heads of that Party which sunk under the Weight of his Influence, and has now risen again, by the Imprudence of some, and Impatience of others, in neither of which he had any Concern.

Thus, my Lord, I have examined the chief Reasons assigned, or suggested, for the unexpected Dissolution of the last Parliament; and in examining them, I have pointed out what Sort of Gentlemen the People ought to chuse, what Sort they ought to avoid chusing at the next Election. If Court Candidates be chosen in any Place, it will be no Excuse to say, they could chuse none other, because none stood against them. No Gentleman, of any tolerable Estate, but would be proud of the Honour of representing his Country in Parliament, if he thought he could obtain it without any Expence but that of attending his Duty when chosen. But by the Corruption of former Times, Elections have become so expensive, that no Gentleman of a moderate Fortune can support it, and

therefore none, or very few such, offer themselves as Candidates, except those who are resolved *to sell* what they *so dearly purchase*. But there is never a Borough in the Kingdom, that may not find Two Gentlemen of their Neighbourhood ready to serve them ~~and~~ they will offer to chuse them without any Expence; and it may be laid down as a general Rule, that those Gentlemen will always be the *best Representatives* of the People who are *least desirous* of being so. Gentlemen who do not solicit, Gentlemen who must be called upon to serve their Country, will always, I say, be its most faithful Servants; but of all Sorts of Men we ought to avoid chusing those whose chief Motive in soliciting to be our Representatives, is their Hope thereby to find an Opportunity to indulge their *Luxury* or their *Avarice*, by obtaining a *Pension*, or some *profitable Post* under the Government.

Ambition, Vanity, and the Love of Fame or Esteem, are Passions which Nature has planted in the Breasts of Mankind, for
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prompting them to be serviceable to one another; but *Luxury* and *Avarice* are Passions introduced by Riches, which never fail to enslave and ruin a Country, where they are allowed to mix in its publick Counsels. From Ambition our Liberties can never be in Danger, because the Ambition of one Man will always be a Check upon the Ambition of another. From Vanity our Liberties can never be in Danger, because a vain Man is always good-natured, and fond of popular Applause, therefore will never continue long united with a Tyrant who must be supported by Cruelty, which exposes him and his Friends to popular Hatred. And from the Love of Fame or Esteem, our Liberties can still less be in Danger; for a Man who betrays the Liberties of his Country can expect nothing but Infamy and Contempt. On the other Hand, the *Luxurious* and *Avaricious* have no Object but Money. For Money they will sacrifice their Country, their Posterity, nay, their future Selves. Therefore our Liberties must be undone, if we do not exclude *Luxury*
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and *Avarice* out of Parliament; that is to say, if we do not render it impossible for any Man to think of supplying his *Luxury* or *Avarice* by his having a Seat in that Assembly.

Even Ambition, Vanity, and the Love of Fame or Esteem, if they are extravagant, or not governed by Prudence and Publick Spirit, are dangerous, because they incite Men to be factious, or sometimes to be too subservient to the Crown; but as our Government is constituted, *Luxury* and *Avarice* are much more dangerous, and will certainly be the Ruin of our Liberties, as they were of the *Roman*, if a Stop be not put to the Growth of these Passions, which, of all others, are the most extravagant, and the most epidemical, as may be plainly perceived from the History of the *Romans*, about the Time they lost their Liberties; and I am afraid, our own History may soon furnish a fresh Example, if we do not take Care to prevent it. This is not to be done by Sumptuary, Prohibitory, or
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Penal Laws, but by Regulations and Customs proper for rooting the Disease out of the Minds of the People; for the *sesquimensal Supplies* of Tyburn may convince us, that when the Mind is by Education or Conversation infected, no Laws, no Punishments can prevent the Effects of the Contagion.

For this salutary Purpose I proposed, in my former Letters to your Lordship, a Law for putting it out of the Power of any Man to have or receive any Pension, Salary, Subsistence, or other pecuniary Reward from the Publick or the Crown, on account of any Post or Employment in our Government, or for any Service he did to his Country, if he was in Possession of such an Estate of his own, as might, with Oeconomy, enable him to subsist and provide for his Family, in a handsome Manner, without it. I shall not repeat what I said upon that Occasion, but I proved, that such a Law could be attended with no bad Consequences; that it would probably have the

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Effect proposed; that if it had, it would save the Nation, particularly the Civil List, a great Sum of Money yearly; and that no Man was, in Equity or true Polity, intitled to a Subsistence from his Country, if he could handsomely subsist himself; and I had the Pleasure to find, that I proved these Points to your Lordship's Satisfaction.

I agree with your Lordship, that there appeared to be too little Publick Spirit in the last Parliament, for any Gentleman to think of proposing such a Bill; I fear it never will be proposed, at least agreed to, if the People do not enforce it; but tho' the People have not hitherto been able to put it out of the Power of all the Rich to supply their *Luxury* or *Avarice* at their Expence, they may, the next Election, put it out of the Power of any of their Representatives to do so. A general Resolution to chuse no Place-man, is, I fear, what cannot be expected from the People of such an extensive Kingdom; and to exact a Bond, or penal Obligation, from the Person to be chosen,

chosen, that he shall not accept of any Post or Employment during the Time of his being a Member, might perhaps be deemed void by our Lawyers, because it might be said to be inconsistent with the Publick Good, to restrain any Man from serving his King or Country ; but what I propose may, I think, be supported in Law, and will be a particular Advantage to every Place that shall embrace the Proposal. It is in short this: That where-ever a Placeman stands Candidate, he shall consign a Bond or penal Obligation, to account for, and pay to the County, City, or Corporation, or to Trustees for their Use, the Salary, Pay, or Profits which shall accrue to him by Means of his Place, during the whole Time of his sitting in Parliament by Virtue of that Election; and that where-ever a Gentleman stands who has no Place, he shall consign such a Bond, with respect to any Place or Pension he may accept of, during the Time of his being in Parliament by Virtue of that Election.

I shall leave to the Lawyers the drawing up of this Bond in its due Form; and

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I must think, that our Courts, both of Law and Equity, would enforce the Performance of it. Surely it is not inconsistent either with Law or Equity, for a Man to promise to contribute what he receives for his Services from his Country in general, to the publick Good of that particular Place which does him the Honour to chuse him its Representative in Parliament; and none of our Laws against Bribery and Corruption can, I think, be so interpreted, as to render an Election upon this Condition void, or to subject the Givers or Receivers of such a Bond or Obligation to any Penalty. As the Money is not to be given to any particular Voter, but to the publick Good of the County, City, or Corporation in general, it is not against any of the Clauses of the Act of the 2d Year of his present Majesty, intituled, *An Act for the more effectual preventing Bribery and Corruption at Elections*. Then, as to the County, City, or Corporation itself, as it is to receive no Money, nor Money's worth, unless the Person chosen has, or ac-
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cepts of a Place or Pension, such Obligation cannot be said to be against the Act of the 7th of K. *William*, intituled, *An Act for preventing Charge and Expence in Elections of Members to serve in Parliament*. And even when the Person chosen has a Place or Pension, as the Money is not to be paid out of the private Fortune of the Obligee, nor can be truly said to be any Expence to him ; the taking or granting such an Obligation cannot, in my Opinion, be said to be against that Act of Parliament ; for from the very Title, the Act appears to have been designed for saving the private Fortunes of Gentlemen from Expence, and what a Gentleman gives out of the Profits of any publick Employment or Pension he enjoys, cannot be said to be any Expence or Charge to his private Fortune.

However, as this Question admits of some Doubt, and as it is a Question that is to be determined by the House of Commons, I would advise that those Counties, Cities, and Corporations only that are to chuse *Placemen* or known *Court Candidates*, should

exact such an Obligation; for they may be assured, that no Gentleman of the *Country Party* will ever vote for making an Election void, on Account of any such Bond or Obligation's having been exacted, and the Courtiers will hardly chuse to have a great many of their Elections declared void; by which Means the People may get this Question determined in their Favour, the very first Session of the next ensuing Parliament; and when this Question is determined in their Favour, they will be provided with a Remedy against Corruption, which 'twill be at every future Election in their Power to apply, and which will be very near equivalent both to an *exceptionless Place-Bill*, and a *Pension-Bill*.

In my Opinion, and I know it is your Lordship's Opinion, no Man employed in the executive Part of our Government, ought to be a Member of the House of Commons, because that House is the *Grand Inquest* of the Nation, consequently, a principal Part of their Duty is to examine
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into the Conduct of every publick Officer, from the highest to the lowest ; and surely, those whose Conduct is to be enquired into, ought to be none of the Inquirers. Again, if a Gentleman has a Pension from the Crown, that is to say from the Publick, it is the Duty of the House of Commons to inquire into the Cause of granting it : If his Majesty out of Charity granted such a Pension, that House has a Right, if they think it necessary, to inquire, whether or no the Person was a proper Object ; and if he was a proper Object, surely he ought not to be a Member of Parliament : If the Pension was granted for Services performed, the House of Commons has a Right to inquire, whether or no such a Pension was honourably merited ; surely the Pensioner himself ought not to be one of the Inquirers. From hence it is clear as Sunshine, that no Placeman or Pensioner ought to be a Member of the House of Commons, even tho' there were no Fear of his being influenced upon other Occasions by his Salary or Pension. But as we
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have now no *Place* or *Pension-Bill*, nor are soon like to have one without any Exceptions ; and as a profitable *Place* or good *Pension* may have an Influence upon a Member's way of voting upon many Occasions, we ought to prevent it, if possible, which I think may be done by what I propose ; for no Placeman or Pensioner will be much influenced by his *Place* or *Pension*, if the *whole Profits* are to be accounted for yearly, and to go to the publick Good of the County, City, or Corporation that chose him.

This Method therefore will be equivalent to, and will indeed be more effectual than any *Place-Bill* hitherto proposed ; and it will likewise fully answer the Intention of a *Pension-Bill* ; because, if there be any Ground of Suspicion, that a Member has been *quartered* upon any *Placeman*, or has *privately* received a *Pension*, his Constituents may file a short Bill in *Chancery* against him, which he must answer *upon Oath* ; for as it is Matter of Discovery and Account, in the Terms of his Obligation, I must suppose,

pose, that Court would compel him to answer; the Filing of such a Bill would cost but a Trifle, and even supposing the Bill should, upon his Answer, be dismissed with Costs, the Plaintiff's Expences could amount to no great Sum. But I must observe, that if the Defendant had actually been *quartered*, or had received any *private Pension*, it would be dangerous for him to deny it in his Answer; because the Court could, and probably would compel Clerks of Offices, and Secretaries or other Servants of Ministers, to be examined, and if any of them made a Discovery, the Defendant might be convicted of Perjury, besides having a Decree against him.

By this Method, therefore, if once determined not to be against any Law now in being, our Liberties would be pretty effectually secured against the Influence of Corruption in Parliament. And if any County, City, or Corporation, did chuse a *Placeman* or *Pensioner*, as his *Salary* or *Pension* would, during that Parliament, accrue to such County, City, or Corporation, and might
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be applied towards lessening the Poor's Rate, or some other publick Burden, it would be an Advantage to every Inhabitant; whereas the whole Money now spent, or laid out on Elections, goes into the Hands of Taverns, Inns, and Alehouses, or into the Pockets of some of the chief Men, or some of the lowest and most venal Voters. This is such a remarkable Difference, that, I hope, every Inhabitant of every little Borough in the Kingdom will take Notice of it, and take proper Methods for preventing a few of their chief Men to jobb and sell them by *public Advertisements*, or like *Sheep* in a *Country Fair*, for the sole Advantage of these Jobbers; for by the Method I have proposed, every Inhabitant will, as I have said, be a Gainer, and a much greater Gainer than if he were to have his equal Share of the Price now usually paid, which seldom is above 1500 l. whereas a *Salary* or *Pension* of 500 l. Yearly, amounts in *seven Years* to 3500 l. *Sterling*.

I have now obeyed your Lordship's Commands, in giving you my Thoughts, in a
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plain but honest Stile, upon the present *extraordinary Crisis*, and if you think they may be of Service, I give you Leave to send them, as you hinted, to my Friend your Bookseller. I have clearly pointed out to the People, whom they ought to chuse, whom they ought to avoid chusing upon this Occasion : I hope I have given them sufficient Reasons for following my Advice. To this I have added a Method, by which they may, from henceforth prevent their being sold by their Representatives in Parliament : If they do not put in Practice what I have proposed, they deserve to be sold, they will be sold to our M——, and by them, perhaps to the *French*, under Pretence of *a safe and honourable Peace* ; for what will not be declared to be such, by those Members who, after examining, in the most formal Manner, the *last famous Convention with Spain*, expressed their most grateful Acknowledgments for his Majesty's particular Care and tender Regard for the Interest of his People, in having obtained by the said Convention a final Adjustment of their long depending Demands, for the Losses

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they had sustained, and an express Stipulation for a Payment to be made in a short Time upon that Account? I need not inform your Lordship, that all Compliments made to the King in such Addresses, are, by the Custom of Parliament, supposed to be made to the M——; and from this Pattern of Complaisance to a M—— upon that Occasion, what may not the People expect from the same Members, or their Friends, upon any future Occasion of a like Nature? May they not expect to be sold to the House of Bourbon in the next Treaty of Peace, and that Sale approved and confirmed by their Representatives? I say, sold to the House of Bourbon; for that M—— who purchases his own Ease and Security, by a dishonourable Treaty of Peace, is as much guilty of selling the Honour and Interest of his Country, as if he had sold for ready Money.

I shall conclude this long Letter to your Lordship, with a Caution to the People, to beware of an Artifice which, I find, is now made use of with uncommon Assiduity, and which has been made use of by every Set of M—— since the Restoration; the Artifice
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I mean, is that of impudently affirming, that the *Cause* of the *Administration* is the *Cause* of the King and *Royal Family*; and that every Man who appears against the former, must of Course be deemed an Enemy to the latter. In the Reigns of K. *Charles II.* and King *James*, every Man who appeared at any Time against the *Administration*, was represented as a *Republican*, and an *Enemy* to the *Royal Family*: Every Man was, by the *M——*, called so, if he shewed any Concern for the *Liberties of his Country*. King *Charles* had too much Sense to allow this to be carried, by any *Administration*, farther than was consistent with his own Safety; but King *James* allowed his *Popish Administration* to carry it so far, that it soon ended in the *Ruin of him and his Family*. Since the *Revolution* it has been the same; but as the Names, *Tory* and *Whig*, have been since that Time much in vogue, if any Man who was deemed a *Whig* appeared against the *Administration*, and in Favour of the *Liberties of his Country*, he was, by the *M——l Tools*, represented as a *Republican*, and an *Enemy* to *Monarchical*

Government; and if any one of those called *Tories* opposed the *Measures*, or the *Jobs* of M——, he was called a *Jacobite* or an *Enemy* to the *Revolution* and *Protestant Succession*. Thus it always has been, thus it always will be; but this *Artifice* was never more *ridiculous* than it is *at present*. Shall it be said, that his Majesty has no well affected Subjects, that the *Protestant Succession* has no Friends but those that are of, or mercenary Slaves or Tools to the *W——le Faction*? Whoever endeavours to propagate such a Falshood, is an *Enemy* to the King, and a *Betrayer* of our present happy Establishment. Whoever *patronises* such a Falshood, ought to meet with the *Detection* of all honest Men; and upon this Occasion, I hope, the People will treat them accordingly.

*Hæc tibi dictabam post fanum putre vacunæ,
Excepto, quod non simul esses, cætera lætus.*

Horat.

I am, My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obliged,
most faithful, and most humble
Servant.